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PAY PHONE PROTECTIONS  
IN A SMARTPHONE SOCIETY: 
THE NEED TO RESTRICT 
SEARCHES OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY 
INCIDENT TO ARREST 
Marty Koresawa* 
 
Since their development in the 1980s, cell phones have become 
ubiquitous in modern society. Today, cell phones feature large data-
storage capacities and can access various types of personal media, 
making them pocket-sized windows into intimate aspects of an 
individual’s life. Yet many courts treat cell phones as if they were 
ordinary physical containers, allowing police officers to search the 
contents of an arrestee’s cell phone incident to an arrest. The 
warrantless search of electronic devices incident to an arrest, however, 
cannot be justified on the same grounds as a similar search of physical 
containers. The government does not have a strong interest in searching 
a cell phone incident to an arrest because the search is exceedingly 
unlikely to reveal a concealed weapon or prevent the destruction of 
evidence. Moreover, given the personal nature of cell phones, 
individuals have a much greater expectation of privacy in their cell 
phones than they do in physical containers stored on their persons. This 
Note argues that search of a cell phone incident to arrest should no 
longer be blindly governed by the same precedent that controls other 
searches incident to arrest, and it urges the Supreme Court to engage in 
a fresh and thoughtful balancing of the interests at stake. Only by 
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creating new doctrine can the Supreme Court adequately protect these 
important interests and restore fidelity to the Fourth Amendment 
principles that should govern searches incident to arrest. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1968, Officer Richard Jenks pulled over and arrested Willie 
Robinson for driving without a license.
1
 Incident to the arrest and 
pursuant to police department instructions, Officer Jenks conducted a 
search of Robinson’s person.
2
 Jenks reached into the breast pocket of 
Robinson’s coat and discovered a crumpled-up cigarette package.
3
 
When he looked inside the package, Jenks found fourteen “gelatin 
capsules of white powder which he thought to be, and which later 
analysis proved to be, heroin.”
4
 
In United States v. Robinson,
5
 the United States Supreme Court 
held that Officer Jenks’s conduct in looking inside the cigarette 
package was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court 
stated that because of “the need to disarm the suspect in order to take 
him into custody” and “to preserve evidence on [the suspect’s] 
person for later use at trial,”
6
 officers may search an arrestee and 
open any containers that they find on the arrestee’s person.
7
 While 
the search of a small container like the cigarette package discovered 
on an arrestee like Robinson might not raise any alarming Fourth 
Amendment concerns, the Robinson Court’s decision has had a 
tremendous impact on modern case law. 
In 2007, in People v. Diaz,
8
 police officers set up a controlled 
purchase of ecstasy.
9
 Gregory Diaz, responsible for driving the 
ecstasy seller to the meeting where the exchange would take place, 
was arrested by officers upon his arrival. While conducting a search 
incident to the arrest, the officers discovered and seized a cell phone 
from Diaz’s pocket.
10
 Thereafter, the officers searched the 
defendant’s phone, found a text message that said “6 4 80” and used 
that message to obtain a confession from Diaz.
11
 The California 
Supreme Court in Diaz held that pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court 
 
 1. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 220 (1973). 
 2. Id. at 221–22. 
 3. Id. at 221–23. 
 4. Id. 
 5. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 6. See id. at 234. 
 7. See id. at 236. 
 8. 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011). 
 9. Id. at 502. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 502–03. 
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precedent, the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit officers from 
searching Diaz’s cell phone.
12
 The Diaz court loosely analogized cell 
phones to items like the cigarette package in Robinson to justify its 
decision.
13
 It went on to say that the propriety of a search incident to 
arrest did not depend on the character of the item searched.
14
 
The search of a drug dealer’s phone, the very device used to 
carry out drug sale transactions, may not sound shocking or 
outrageous. However, the Diaz court’s reasoning in justifying the 
search through its loose analogy to a cigarette package raises one 
important question: Had Officer Jenks discovered a cell phone in 
Willie Robinson’s pocket, and not a cigarette package, would the 
U.S. Supreme Court have approved the search of a text message 
folder incident to arrest? 
This Note argues that analogizing cell phones to physical 
containers, like the cigarette package in Robinson, is faulty and 
results in severe Fourth Amendment violations of privacy. These 
intrusions signify the need to revisit the decisions governing searches 
incident to arrest so that future courts will not continue eroding 
Fourth Amendment protections. 
Part II discusses the background of Fourth Amendment 
principles, the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, and the doctrine’s 
application to advancing technology. Part III discusses how applying 
the principles of Robinson to cell phones is inherently flawed, and it 
critiques the way that lower courts have been willing to apply 
precedent to rationalize warrantless searches of cell phones incident 
to arrest. Finally, Part IV explores potential solutions that would 
place much-needed limitations on searches incident to arrest. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Cell phones have become ubiquitous in modern society,
15
 
morphing from two-pound portable communication devices into 
pocket-sized computers with massive capabilities.
16
 As a result, the 
 
 12. Id. at 511. 
 13. Id. at 505–06. 
 14. Id. at 506. 
 15. As of June 2012, 321.7 million wireless subscriptions existed in the United States. CTIA 
Consumer Info: U.S. Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/consumer_info/index.cfm/ 
AID/10323 (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
 16. In 1973, Motorola developed a prototype of the first cell phone, which measured over a 
foot long, weighed almost two pounds, and could store approximately thirty phone numbers. 
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collision between advancing technology and the Fourth Amendment 
was inevitable.
17
 The following discussion examines the case law 
that governs the basic principles behind Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and searches incident to arrest, and it considers the 
application of those principles toward recently emerging 
technologies. 
A.  General Fourth Amendment Principles 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches of 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects.”
18
 The Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to govern police conduct that 
either physically invades an area enumerated in the Fourth 
Amendment or infringes on a person’s justifiable expectation of 
privacy.
19
 
In Katz v. United States,
20
 the Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited attaching a wiretap to the outside of a public 
telephone booth because it intruded on the defendant’s justifiable 
expectation of privacy.
21
 Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, provided 
a two-prong test to determine what constitutes a reasonable 
expectation of privacy: (1) the person has a subjective expectation of 
privacy; and (2) society is willing to recognize that expectation.
22
 
Generally, this expectation of privacy requires government 
agents to obtain a warrant based on probable cause before they can 
search anything protected under the provisions of the Fourth 
Amendment.
23
 These provisions restrict state action in the following 
ways: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
 
Liane Cassavoy, In Pictures: A History of Cell Phones, at 1 of 16, PCWORLD (May 7, 2007, 1:00 
AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/131450/in_pictures_a_history_of_cell_phones.html. 
Modern-day smartphones are capable of far greater data storage and data access capabilities. See, 
e.g., iPhone: Technical Specifications, APPLE, http://support.apple.com/kb/sp2 (last modified 
Feb. 19, 2010). 
 17. See, e.g., Diaz, 244 P.3d at 503–04. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 19. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–51 (2012). 
 20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 21. Id. at 353. 
 22. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 23. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.
24
 
The Fourth Amendment is not an absolute demand for a warrant 
or probable cause. The touchstone of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is that searches must be reasonable.
25
 A warrantless 
search may withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny if “the 
governmental interest [that] allegedly justifies official intrusion” 
outweighs “the constitutionally protected [privacy] interests of the 
private citizen.”
26
 
Courts have delineated the factors and principles that should be 
considered to determine the weight of the privacy interest and the 
weight of the governmental need. These factors include society’s 
expectation of privacy,
27
 the officer’s safety,
28
 the risk of losing 
evidence,
29
 and the need for clear rules that are easily applied.
30
 The 
Supreme Court has also stated that “[t]he scope of [a] search must be 
strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its 
initiation permissible.”
31
 
B.  Searches Incident to Arrest 
One exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements is 
searches incident to arrest.
32
 The Court in Chimel v. California
33
 was 
the first to articulate the modern-day conception of a search incident 
to an arrest.
34
 In Chimel, police officers arrested the defendant at his 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply 
‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (emphasis added)). 
 26. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968). 
 27. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985); Terry, 392 U.S. at 24–25. 
 28. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969); Terry, 392 U.S. at 23. 
 29. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63; Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011). 
 30. Acevedo v. California, 500 U.S. 565, 576 (1991); see United States v. Robinson, 414 
U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (creating a categorical authority to searches incident to arrest because 
officers make “quick ad hoc judgment[s]” in the field). 
 31. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 32. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224 (“It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a 
traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 33. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 34. Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 
33 (2008). 
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home on burglary charges.
35
 A subsequent search of the defendant’s 
entire three-bedroom home led officers to discover evidence that 
linked the defendant to the burglary.
36
 The Supreme Court held that 
the search of the defendant’s home was unconstitutional because the 
rationale underlying the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine could not 
justify a search of the defendant’s entire home.
37
 
The Court in Chimel reasoned that two compelling needs 
justified a search incident to an arrest: first, the need for officers to 
disarm an arrestee; and second, the need to prevent the concealment 
or destruction of evidence.
38
 The Court recognized that searches 
incident to arrest may extend to areas where an arrestee may obtain a 
weapon or destructible evidence.
39
 However, a full search of an 
arrestee’s house would extend beyond these areas and violate the 
main evil that the Fourth Amendment sought to proscribe: “general 
warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the 
colonists.”
40
 
The language in Chimel resulted in some confusion about 
whether the Court restricted the use of these searches only to 
situations in which the search would promote officer safety or 
prevent the loss of evidence that was material to the arrest, or 
whether the Court granted officers a categorical right to search an 
arrestee.
41
 The Chimel Court stressed that a warrantless search 
should be no more intrusive than is necessary to address the concerns 
that justify the departure from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and 
probable cause requirements.
42
 However, the plain language of the 
 
 35. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753. 
 36. Id. at 754. 
 37. Id. at 768. 
 38. Id. at 762–63. 
 39. Id. at 763. 
 40. Id. at 761, 765–66. 
 41. Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to 
Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 392 (2010). In Chimel, the Court states the following: 
[I]t is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to 
remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect 
his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest 
itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search 
for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment 
or destruction. 
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. 
 42. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1967)). 
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opinion would suggest that the Court authorized officers to search an 
arrestee for any purpose incident to a lawful custodial arrest.
43
 Put 
differently, the “bare fact of arrest” grants officers a right to search 
an arrestee.
44
 
In United States v. Robinson, the Supreme Court ruled that 
searches incident to arrest were per se reasonable, placing significant 
weight on the need for administrable Fourth Amendment limitations 
in stressful and uncertain situations.
45
 In Robinson, an officer 
arrested the defendant for operating a vehicle without a license.
46
 
When the officer subsequently searched the defendant, he found a 
“crumpled up cigarette package” in the breast pocket of the 
defendant’s coat.
47
 Looking inside the package, the officer found 
what later turned out to be heroin.
48
 
The Court overturned the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit decision to suppress the evidence.
49
 The appellate 
court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. 
Ohio,
50
 reasoning that all searches must be “no more intrusive” than 
the justifications for initiating the search allow.
51
 The appellate court 
reasoned that the search could not be justified by an evidentiary 
purpose
52
 and that the officer had already recovered the only 
evidence related to the crime that triggered the arrest that “he could 
possibly have had probable cause to believe was in the arrestee’s 
possession.”
53
 
The appellate court further held that searches incident to arrest 
that were justified only by the need to disarm an arrestee must be 
limited to a frisk unless “circumstances . . . give the officer 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person with whom he is 
 
 43. Id. at 763. 
 44. Logan, supra note 41, at 392. 
 45. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5, 235 (1973). 
 46. Id. at 220. 
 47. Id. at 223. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 236. 
 50. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 51. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev’d, 414 U.S. 218. 
 52. Id. at 1095. 
 53. Id. at 1094. Officer Jenks pulled over Robinson after witnessing him driving a vehicle, 
and Jenks had reason to believe Robinson’s license had been revoked. Id. at 1088. Therefore, the 
only evidence the officer needed or could possibly have found was the fraudulent temporary 
driver’s permit that he had already obtained. Id. at 1093. 
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dealing is armed and presently dangerous.”
54
 The court 
acknowledged that while a frisk may not uncover all weapons and 
would not eliminate all conceivable danger to the officer, it would 
uncover a majority of weapons. Additionally, the balancing of police 
and privacy interests favored limiting weapons searches to frisks 
unless other reasons supported a more intrusive search.
55
 
The Supreme Court rejected the appellate court’s reasoning and 
established a bright-line rule that authorized officers to search an 
arrestee’s person as well as the contents of any containers found on 
an arrestee’s person.
56
 The Robinson Court reasoned that because an 
officer’s extended exposure to an arrestee during a custodial arrest 
posed a significantly greater risk than during a brief investigative 
stop, all custodial arrests justified a full search of the person, even if 
the offense of arrest was a mere traffic violation.
57
 The Robinson 
Court rejected a subjective rule that would force officers to assess the 
probability that an arrestee possessed weapons or evidence and stated 
that a lawful arrest is sufficient to justify a search of the arrestee’s 
person.
58
 
Accordingly, Robinson stands for the proposition that searches 
of the person are automatically permissible after an arrest and need 
not be supported by the underlying justifications espoused in 
Chimel.
59
 Subsequent cases have applied Robinson and its progeny to 
justify searches of wallets and address books found on an arrestee’s 
person.
60
 
C.  Technology and the Search Incident to Arrest 
The Fourth Amendment’s clash with technology is not 
something that the Founders could have foreseen. As new 
 
 54. Id. at 1097. 
 55. Id. at 1099–1101. 
 56. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
 57. Id. at 234–35. 
 58. Id. at 235. 
 59. Gershowitz, supra note 34, at 34; Chelsea Oxton, Note, The Search Incident to Arrest 
Exception Plays Catch Up: Why Police May No Longer Search Cell Phones Incident to Arrest 
Without a Warrant, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1157, 1167 (2011). 
 60. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a 
search of a wallet and address book incident to arrest was valid); see also United States v. Lynch, 
908 F. Supp. 284, 288 (D.V.I. 1995) (citing numerous cases upholding searches of wallets and 
address books incident to arrest across various circuits). 
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technologies emerge, courts have placed great emphasis on the 
personal and intrusive capabilities of technologies.
61
 Both state and 
federal courts, however, have generally been hesitant to differentiate 
modern devices that store electronic data from more conventional 
items.
62
 Courts have either made a direct analogy to conventional 
containers based on functional equivalence or entirely disregarded 
the nature and quality of a particular item.
63
 
1.  Searches of Pagers Incident to Arrest 
In United States v. Chan,
64
 an undercover DEA agent met with a 
drug dealer in a motel room to purchase heroin.
65
 The drug dealer, 
using the motel telephone, paged the defendant and arranged for a 
delivery of heroin.
66
 After the defendant made the delivery, the 
agents arrested him and seized an inactive pager from his person.
67
 
The agents activated the pager and thereafter retrieved several 
telephone numbers that connected the defendant to the drug dealer in 
the motel room.
68
 
The court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the 
evidence that the DEA agents retrieved from his pager.
69
 The court 
compared the pager to a closed container and concluded that the 
Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the agent’s search of the 
 
 61. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“We think that obtaining by 
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of a home that could not 
otherwise be obtained without ‘physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ 
constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public 
use.” (internal citation omitted)); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (“To read the 
Constitution [to not protect telephone booths] is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone 
has come to play in private communication.”). 
 62. See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that a cell-phone 
search incident to arrest was valid because police had the authority to search any containers 
immediately associated with the person during an arrest); United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 
531, 535 (N.D. Cal. 1993); People v. Balint, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 211, 218 (Ct. App. 2006) (“We 
perceive no reasonable basis to distinguish between records stored electronically on the laptop 
and documents placed in a filing cabinet or information stored in a microcassette.”).  
 63. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2008); Chan, 830 F. 
Supp. at 535; Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 886, 891 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 723 S.E.2d 924 
(Ga. 2012) (stating that cell phones should be considered a “container that stores thousands of 
individual containers”). 
 64. 830 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
 65. Id. at 532–33. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 536. 
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defendant’s pager because the pager was searched incident to 
arrest.
70
 The court relied on New York v. Belton,
71
 which stated that a 
closed container “may . . . be searched whether it is open or closed,” 
to support its conclusion that the search was valid.
72
 The court 
conceded that “there was no danger that [the defendant] would in any 
way produce a weapon from the pager, and probably no threat that he 
would access the pager to destroy evidence,” but it still found the 
search constitutional because it considered the pager to be a 
container.
73
 
Subsequent cases analyzed that very same issue and arrived at 
the same conclusion.
74
 In United States v. Ortiz,
75
 the court upheld 
the retrieval of telephone numbers from a pager recovered incident to 
arrest.
76
 However, the court in Ortiz, while agreeing with the 
decision in Chan, paid particular attention to the specific 
characteristics of the pager that connected it to one of the 
justifications behind a search incident to arrest.
77
 Specifically, the 
court noted that because a pager has a finite amount of memory, the 
data could be lost due to incoming messages, and in some cases, 
turning off a pager could erase its memory.
78
 Accordingly, these 
characteristics suggested that evidence was at risk of being lost and 
justified the officer’s search of the pager. 
While the use of pagers has become a rarity in our society, now 
replaced by cell phones and more sophisticated technological 
devices,
79
 these cases continue to be relevant today. The pager cases 
laid the framework for analyzing the propriety of searches of cell 
phones incident to arrest.
80
 
 
 70. Id. at 534–36. 
 71. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 72. Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 535. 
 73. Id. at 536. 
 74. Gershowitz, supra note 34, at 37. 
 75. 84 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 76. Id. at 984. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Gershowitz, supra note 34, at 38. 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. McCray, No. CR408-231, 2009 WL 29607, at *3 (S.D. Ga. 
Jan. 5, 2009) (“[L]aw enforcement officers have the authority to immediately ‘search’ or retrieve, 
incident to a valid arrest, information from a pager in order to prevent its destruction as 
evidence.” (quoting Oritz, 84 F. 3d at 984)). 
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2.  Searches of Cell Phones Incident to Arrest 
When addressing the search of cell phones incident to arrest, 
many courts have followed a line of reasoning similar to that used in 
the pager cases.
81
 Like the pager cases, the central question regarding 
an officer’s authority to search a cell phone pursuant to Robinson 
remains the same: whether a device containing digital data is a 
“container” as contemplated by the Robinson Court.
82
 However, the 
reasoning has become far more strained, since courts have shown 
their willingness to simply ignore the key features that make the 
analogy work.
83
 Although one court described cell phones as novel 
objects that defy easy categorization,
84
 most courts have continued to 
validate the analogy of cell phones to containers.
85
 
For example, in United States v. Finley,
86
 the court accepted the 
government’s argument that a cell phone is like a closed container.
87
 
Therefore, the court found that pursuant to Robinson, the cell phone 
fell within the scope of a search incident to arrest.
88
 Similar to the 
way the Chan court treated the pager, the Finley court treated the cell 
phone as if it were a physical container.
89
 The Court of Appeals of 
Georgia in Hawkins v. State
90
 also applied similar reasoning, but 
instead of treating cell phones as traditional containers, it treated the 
cell phone as a container with many containers inside.
91
 
 
 81. Id. (citing “recent cases [that] have treated mobile telephones and digital cameras in the 
same manner” as pagers). 
 82. Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 459 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. granted, 68 So. 3d 235 
(Fla. 2011). 
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 84. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (“Given their unique nature as 
multifunctional tools, cell phones defy easy categorization.”). 
 85. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) (accepting the 
defendant’s argument that a cell phone is like a closed container); Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 
886, 891 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (treating a cell phone as a container containing many containers), 
aff’d, 723 S.E.2d 924, 925–26 (Ga. 2012). 
 86. 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 87. Id. at 259. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Compare id. at 260 (holding that the search of the cell phone was lawful because “[t]he 
permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest extends to containers found on the 
arrestee’s person”), with United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 536 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding 
that the search of the pager was lawful because the pager was a container that was seized incident 
to arrest). 
 90. 704 S.E.2d 886, 891 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). 
 91. Id. at 891. 
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Other cases indirectly relate cell phones to the pager-container 
cases by focusing on the similar functions of pagers and cell phones. 
In United States v. Murphy,
92
 the court upheld the search of text 
messages stored in the defendant’s cell phone incident to arrest.
93
 
The court, citing to Ortiz to support its decision,
94
 explained that, like 
pagers, the information stored on a cell phone was volatile; as a 
result, the officer’s search of the cell phone was justified to preserve 
evidence.
95
 However, the court also suggested that data volatility did 
not depend on storage capacity,
96
 diverting from the rationale used in 
Ortiz, which was premised on the limited nature of a pager’s 
memory.
97
 
Other courts have employed far simpler analogies that disregard 
the nature and quantity of the information contained in cell phones 
altogether. Rather than analogize a cell phone to a container by 
function, these courts have been willing to equate any object to a 
cigarette package, as long as the object is found on the arrestee’s 
person;
98
 one such case was People v. Diaz.
99
 
In Diaz, officers arrested the defendant for suspected drug 
dealing.
100
 When the officers seized the defendant’s cell phone 
incident to arrest and searched its text message inbox, they found 
evidence of a drug deal.
101
 The defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence recovered from his cell phone.
102
 
The Supreme Court of California affirmed the denial of the 
defendant’s motion.
103
 The court relied on U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions that justified the search of any container found on the 
person.
104
 While the court acknowledged the vast amount of 
information that is stored on cell phones as compared to other 
 
 92. 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 93. Id. at 411. 
 94. Id. (citing United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Murphy, 552 F.3d at 411. 
 97. Ortiz, 84 F.3d at 984. 
 98. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 506–07 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 
(2011). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 502. 
 101. Id. at 502–03. 
 102. Id. at 503. 
 103. Id. at 511. 
 104. Id. at 506–07. 
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containers, it nevertheless held that the nature of the object was 
irrelevant for Fourth Amendment analysis.
105
 
In contrast, some courts have reasoned that the nature of the data 
stored within cell phones is critical to the Fourth Amendment 
analysis.
106
 For example, in State v. Smith,
107
 the Supreme Court of 
Ohio suppressed the evidence that was recovered from the 
defendant’s cell phone.
108
 The court abandoned the reasoning of the 
pager cases and rejected the government’s analogy that a cell phone 
is a closed container.
109
 The court relied on New York v. Belton, 
which defined a closed container as “any object capable of holding 
another object.”
110
 The Smith court continued that the contents of an 
electronic device are “wholly unlike any physical object found 
within a closed container,” and it held that a cell phone was not a 
closed container as contemplated by Robinson.
111
 
The flaw in the Diaz court’s rationale becomes apparent when 
one considers cell-phone-search cases like Smith, in which the court 
recognized that applying Robinson to modern devices conflicts with 
the underlying principles of the Fourth Amendment.
112
 The search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine and other Fourth Amendment exceptions 
are based on the premise that the governmental interest outweighs 
the privacy concerns of private citizens.
113
 
III.  CRITIQUE 
A.  Robinson and Its Progeny 
Should Not Control Searches of 
Cell Phones Incident to Arrest 
Cases that authorize warrantless searches of cell phones incident 
to arrest often rely on Robinson to support their conclusions.
114
 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. See, e.g., Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1167–70 (D. Or. Jan. 18, 
2012); Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 461 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Smith, 920 
N.E.2d 949, 956 (Ohio 2009). . 
 107. 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009). 
 108. Id. at 956. 
 109. Id. at 953–54. 
 110. Id. at 954 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981)). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 956. 
 113. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968). 
 114. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007); People v. Diaz, 
244 P.3d 501, 505–06 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011). 
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However, the analogies to Robinson that courts use in these cases fail 
to account for the key characteristics of cell phones that make 
Robinson inapplicable. 
1.  Robinson’s Scope Was Limited 
by the Physical Restrictions Inherent in 
the Technology Available at That Time 
One scholar has appropriately criticized the courts’ use of 
functional analogies to equate cell phones to standard containers, 
stating that this mode of analysis “leads courts to deviate over time 
(and often subconsciously) from the intended arc of precedent.”
115
 In 
order to avoid such faulty analogies, courts must account for any 
implied limitations of prior decisions when considering whether 
functional analogies are appropriate.
116
 One such implicit limitation 
has been the physical limits of containers at the time of the decision. 
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly define a 
“container” as “any object capable of holding another object” until 
Belton in 1981,
117
 the historical context of Robinson strongly 
suggests that the Court’s holding considered only physical objects.
118
 
A search of a pocket-sized container would have a natural limit to its 
invasiveness because only so much information could physically be 
in someone’s pocket. Additionally, the Supreme Court viewed the 
nature of what could be found as far less personal,
119
 unlike the 
communications, photos, contacts, and other information regularly 
 
 115. Luke M. Milligan, Analogy Breakers: A Reality Check on Emerging Technologies, 80 
MISS. L.J. 1319, 1328–30 (2011). 
 116. Id. at 1332–33. 
 117. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.4 (1981). By the time the Court decided Belton 
on July 1, 1981, cell phones were already in the headlines. FCC Plans to Give AT&T Large Share 
of Mobile Phone Market, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1981. Therefore, the fact that Belton defined 
containers as “any object capable of holding another object” once portable electronic devices 
began to impact the United States supports an inference that the Court intended not to adjudicate 
rules regarding electronic devices until after it understood the capabilities of the devices. 
 118. This Note adopts Belton’s definition of a physical container as “any object capable of 
holding another object.” Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 n.4. A physical object is defined as a tangible 
item. 
 119. Cf. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 
U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (stating that vehicles "seldom serve as . . . the repository of personal effects" 
(alteration in original)). 
  
Summer 2012] PAY PHONE PROTECTIONS 1367 
stored on modern cell phones that could reveal the intimate details of 
one’s life.
120
 
Moreover, a rule that treats searches incident to arrest as per se 
reasonable, as adopted in Robinson, would be highly inconsistent 
with Fourth Amendment principles unless the Robinson Court 
presumed the privacy interests at stake were minimal. The dissent in 
Robinson pointed out that under the majority’s reasoning, even when 
the likelihood of finding weapons is highly remote, officers would be 
granted authority to conduct highly intrusive searches.
121
 However, 
the examples cited to by the dissent—wallets and an attorney’s 
envelope
122
—either have only limited personal information or are 
anecdotal. Thus, the level of intrusion that the Robinson Court 
authorized was categorically minimal, and even when accounting for 
instances in which the government need was trivial, the searches 
would be reasonable overall. 
At the very least, the Supreme Court did not and could not 
contemplate that searches incident to arrest could potentially intrude 
into unlimited private information. Because the development of cell 
phones did not take off until after Robinson, the court could not have 
foreseen the vast and widespread use of technologies available in 
today’s society.
123
 These technological advancements have allowed 
the average amount and personal nature of information within a 
 
 120. See, e.g., Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169–70 (D. Or. Jan. 18, 2012) 
(noting that in Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d 440 (W.D. Va. 2009), officers found intimate 
pictures of the owner’s girlfriend stored on his cell phone); Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 
460–61 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“[C]ell phones can make the entirety of one’s personal life 
available for perusing by an officer every time someone is arrested for any offense. It seems this 
result could not have been contemplated or intended by the Robinson court.”). 
 121. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 256–57 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“Would it be reasonable for the police officer, because of the possibility that a razor blade was 
hidden somewhere in the wallet, to open it, remove all the contents, and examine each item 
carefully? Or suppose a lawyer lawfully arrested for a traffic offense is found to have a sealed 
envelope on his person. Would it be permissible for the arresting officer to tear open the envelope 
in order to make sure that it did not contain a clandestine weapon—perhaps a pin or a razor 
blade?”). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Technology Timeline: 1752–1990, PUB. BROAD. SERV., http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/ 
telephone/timeline/timeline_text.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2011). In the 1970s, the FCC was still 
in the process of approving cell phone systems. SRI International, The Cellular Telephone, in 
THE ROLE OF NSF'S SUPPORT OF ENGINEERING IN ENABLING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION–
PHASE II (David Roessner ed., 1998). The first smartphones were capable of accessing the 
Internet, running programs, and storing massive amounts of data, Cassavoy, supra note 16, at 3 of 
16, and became available to consumers in 2001. Id. at 6 of 16. 
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person’s pocket today to far exceed what the Court could have 
expected at the time it decided Robinson. 
However, many courts continue to discount the importance of 
physicality and analogize cell phones to conventional items.
124
 Some 
courts even disregard the nature of the item altogether, without ever 
questioning whether a 1970s decision should apply to twenty-first 
century technology.
125
 This faulty application of Robinson has led 
courts to ratify highly invasive police conduct that is inconsistent 
with the Fourth Amendment.
126
 
2.  Robinson Sought to Eliminate 
Quick, Ad Hoc Judgments in the Field 
in Order to Maximize Officer Safety 
When dealing specifically with physical containers, officers face 
an inherently uncertain situation because the presence of weapons or 
destructible evidence is unclear.
127
 This inherent uncertainty is 
precisely what necessitated the per se rule established in Robinson. 
The Robinson Court established this rule to prevent officers in 
the field from being forced to determine in ambiguous circumstances 
whether a search falls within a recognized exception.
128
 The two 
underlying rationales that justify a search incident to arrest are to 
disarm arrestees and to prevent the destruction of evidence.
129
 When 
the Court decided that a search incident to arrest was per se 
reasonable, the Court relied heavily on a policy rationale that police 
officers should not have to predict how courts would define the 
permissible scope of a search incident to arrest in ambiguous 
situations.
130
 
The Supreme Court has often established bright-line rules to 
ensure police officers have a clear understanding of the scope of their 
 
 124. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 506 (Cal. 2011) (stating that the relevant high 
court decisions do not “depend[] on the item’s character”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011). 
 125. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007). But see 
Smallwood, 61 So. 3d at 461. 
 126. Smallwood, 61 So. 3d at 461 (“[C]ell phones can make the entirety of one’s personal life 
available for perusing by an officer every time someone is arrested for any offense. It seems this 
result could not have been contemplated or intended by the Robinson court.”). 
 127. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234–35 & n.5. 
 128. Id. at 235. 
 129. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969). 
 130. Id. 
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authority.
131
 Bright-line rules reduce officer hesitation in the field 
that may endanger the officer or lead to less effective law 
enforcement.
132
 Although the Robinson Court acknowledged the 
need to prevent the destruction of evidence,
133
 its analysis suggests 
that its primary concern was to ensure that officers could disarm an 
arrestee to protect themselves from physical injury without fear that 
valuable evidence would later be suppressed in court.
134
 
The Robinson Court maximized officer safety by allowing 
officers to fully inspect any item no matter how innocuous it may 
appear externally.
135
 As a consequence, the Court also allowed 
officers to seize any and all evidence that could be destroyed.
136
 
However, unlike physical objects, the data stored on cell phones 
cannot contain a clandestine weapon. Because cell phones only store 
electronic data, courts have recognized that cell phones do not 
implicate officer-safety concerns.
137
 Therefore, the primary reason 
behind Robinson’s bright-line rule—officer safety—is inapplicable. 
3.  Cell Phones Do Not Implicate 
the Evidentiary Concerns Underlying 
Searches Incident to Arrest 
In light of the fact that cell phones do not implicate officer-
safety concerns, the only remaining justification to search arrestees 
incident to an arrest is to prevent the loss of evidence. However, the 
 
 131. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (“Fourth Amendment 
balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of 
government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for 
constitutional review.”); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 453 (1994) (holding that an 
ambiguous request for an attorney does not cease questioning because to impose such a rule 
would force officers to make difficult judgment calls about the suspect’s desire for an attorney); 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 n.30 (1982) (expressing concern over “[t]he propriety of 
the warrantless search . . . turn[ing] on an objective appraisal of all the surrounding 
circumstances”); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1981) (holding that incident to a 
lawful arrest, police officers may search the entire passenger compartment of a vehicle, resolving 
a conflict of authorities that reach different conclusions in similar factual circumstances). 
 132. Cf. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595–96 (2006) (discussing the consequences of 
applying the exclusionary rule to a knock-and-announce violation). 
 133. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
 134. See id. at 234–35. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 234. 
 137. See, e.g., United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 
May 23, 2007). 
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electronic data stored on a cell phone are different from physical 
evidence because, as a general matter, they cannot be destroyed. 
Unlike physical evidence, electronic data cannot become 
irrecoverable.
138
 Courts have reasoned that text messages and call 
logs stored on a cell phone are volatile because incoming 
communications may erase the existing information.
139
 Remote-wipe 
applications that allow users to delete data remotely increase this 
concern.
140
 However, any deleted evidence is not permanently lost 
because a cell phone’s deleted data may still be recovered.
141
 
Courts and scholars have recognized this fact.
142
 Call records 
and text messages are available from the service provider.
143
 Even if 
service providers do not keep such information, when a user deletes 
data on a cell phone, the device marks that data to be overwritten if 
necessary.
144
 This “deleted” data actually remain on a cell phone 
until new data overwrites them.
145
 New devices are capable of 
 
 138. See United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 WL 1925032, at *7 n.3 (E.D. 
Mo. Apr. 29, 2008); Matthew E. Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New 
Frontier of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183, 199–200 (2010). 
 139. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3–4 (E.D. Wis. 
Feb. 8, 2008) (finding that “call histories on cell phones could be deleted or lost, giving rise to a 
legitimate concern about destruction of evidence”); United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 
1291, 1303–04 (D. Kan. 2003) (finding that cell phones have limited memory and therefore 
incoming calls could overwrite earlier stored numbers). However, one court stated that text 
messages are not volatile because they will remain on the cell phone unless the user deletes them. 
United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008). 
 140. Ashley B. Snyder, The Fourth Amendment and Warrantless Cell Phone Searches: When 
Is Your Cell Phone Protected?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 155, 179 (2011); see also Kevin 
McLaughlin, McAfee Unveils Strategy to Secure Mobile Devices, Data, Apps, CRN (Sept. 20, 
2011, 8:44PM ), www.crn.com/news/security/231601800/mcafee-unveils-strategy-to-secure-
mobile-devices-data-apps.htm (“One example on the consumer side is McAfee Mobile Security, 
which allows customers to . . . remotely wipe data on devices if they’re lost or stolen.”). 
 141. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 143. James, 2008 WL 1925032, at *7 n.3 (“The service provider keeps records of the 
incoming and outgoing calls.”); Orso, supra note 138, at 199. The Computer Crime and 
Intellectual Property Section of the U.S. Department of Justice reported that call detail records 
and text message details may be stored by a service provider for up to seven years, and text 
message content for up to ninety days. Cell Phone Location Tracking Request Response—Cell 
Phone Company Data Retention Chart, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/cell-phone-location-
tracking-request-response-cell-phone-company-data-retention-chart (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
 144. Jacob Leibenluft, Do Text Messages Live Forever? How a Dirty SMS Can Come Back to 
Haunt You, SLATE (May 1, 2008, 6:51 PM), www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
explainer/2008/05/do_text_messages_live_forever.html. Data occupy a certain “location” on a 
memory storage device, and they are not actually erased from the device’s memory until new 
information needs to use the same memory “location” and replaces the old information. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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recovering deleted data off old phones and other portable electronic 
devices.
146
 For example, companies such as Cellebrite offer a mobile 
forensic device capable of extracting existing, hidden, and deleted 
data.
147
 
Programs for computers, such as “Evidence Eliminator,” go a 
step further than cell phones do by not only deleting any previously 
existing computer data but also overwriting the computer’s memory 
with random data.
148
 Analogous programs for cell phones arguably 
make data on cell phones volatile and justify searches of cell phones 
incident to arrest based on the need to prevent the destruction of 
evidence. 
However, computer forensics experts are able to recover data 
that have been overwritten by many layers of new data.
149
 
Considering the natural progression of technology and the increasing 
similarity between modern cell phones and computers,
150
 computer 
forensic experts are likely to soon be able to recover overwritten data 
from cell phones. Additionally, cell phone programs are dependent 
on a user or signal to initiate them.
151
 Put differently, if an officer is 
able to prevent a cell phone from receiving a signal, an individual is 
powerless to eliminate the data on that device. Therefore, programs 
cannot destroy the data if officers seize an arrestee’s phone and 
either remove the battery or place the cell phone in an area where it 
cannot receive a signal.
152
 Moreover, cutting off a cell phone’s signal 
would be far more effective at preserving evidence than would the 
officer browsing through a cell phone’s contents contemporaneously 
 
 146. See generally, WAYNE JANSEN & RICK AYERS, GUIDELINES ON CELL PHONE 
FORENSICS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND 
TECHNOLOGY 13–23 (2007), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-101/ 
SP800-101.pdf (generally describing the capabilities of the tools available to law enforcement for 
the purposes of recovering data from cell phones and other portable devices). 
 147. UFED Ultimate, CELLEBRITE, http://www.cellebrite.com/mobile-forensics-products/ 
forensics-products/ufed-ultimate.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
 148. Daniel Engber, Can You Ever Really Erase a Computer File? What If You Use Evidence 
Eliminator?, SLATE (June 29, 2005), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/ 
2005/06/can_you_ever_really_erase_a_computer_file.html. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See, e.g., Martyn Williams, Samsung Phone Features a Hard Drive: Windows-based 
Cell Phone Includes 3GB Hard Drive for Storage, PCWORLD (Mar. 10, 2005), www.pc 
world.com/article/119961/samsung_phone_features_a_hard_drive.html. 
 151. Jamie Lendino, Kill Your Phone Remotely, PCMAG (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.pc 
mag.com/article2/0,2817,2352755,00.asp#fbid=2WAnUDlh8gk. 
 152. Id. 
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with the arrest because it would ensure that the arrestee cannot 
actually delete the data on a cell phone. 
Arguably, there will be rare circumstances in which evidence 
contained on a cell phone could be destroyed, such as when forensic 
experts cannot recover overwritten data. However, the Court has 
been, and should be, guided by general circumstances rather than 
anecdotal outliers when it sets out to establish the procedural rules 
relating to the Fourth Amendment and specifically searches incident 
to arrest.
153
 Absent rare circumstances, cell phones generally will not 
implicate the government’s interest of preserving evidence. 
Therefore, cell phones, as a category, cannot implicate the need 
to prevent the destruction of evidence. Unlike physical objects and 
containers, the data stored in cell phones cannot be irrevocably lost 
because they are available through alternative sources and can be 
recovered via current forensic devices. 
4.  Excluding Cell Phones from 
Robinson’s Bright-Line Rule 
Will Not Create Confusion 
Arguably, excluding electronic data from Robinson’s bright-line 
rule would force officers to engage in fact-specific inquiries while in 
the field, which would be inconsistent with the Court’s policy 
favoring clear and easily applied rules. Although legitimate, this 
concern is generally inapposite in the context of electronic data. 
Criminal procedure values the “clarity and certainty” provided 
by a “one size fits all” rule.
154
 Key search-incident-to-arrest decisions 
have relied on this governing principle, noting that an ambiguous 
rule will impede the enforcement of the law just as much as 
ambiguous facts.
155
 Fact-sensitive exceptions to firm rules have the 
potential to create uncertainty, but exceptions based on objective 
 
 153. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (accounting for the general 
characteristics of children rather than looking at the specific characteristics of the child in 
question); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (quoting Dunaway v. New 
York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)). 
 154. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2408–09 (Alito, J., dissenting); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 
615, 623 (2004). 
 155. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 
218, 235 (1974). 
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characteristics that are generally applicable to a whole class will not 
impede the clarity of a rule.
156
 
As discussed above, cell phones do not implicate the twin 
justifications for searches incident to arrest.
157
 The fact that a cell 
phone’s data cannot be used as a weapon and are recoverable despite 
deletion are objective characteristics about cell phones that are 
generally applicable to all cell phones. Accordingly, a holding that 
exempts cell-phone searches from a rule of per se reasonableness 
will not impede the clarity of the rules that govern searches incident 
to arrest. The policy rationales underlying Robinson’s bright-line rule 
do not compel courts to treat cell phones as “containers.” 
B.  Cell Phones Are Entitled to 
Heightened Protections Due to the 
Intrusiveness of a Cell-Phone Search 
When assessing the reasonableness of an exception to the 
warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, 
the Supreme Court balances the government’s interest in crime 
prevention with society’s privacy interests.
158
 When officers 
undertake more intrusive searches, the Supreme Court has often 
required a stricter adherence to the Fourth Amendment.
159
 
When balancing the public and private interests to determine the 
reasonableness of a search, the Court often considers what, if any, 
expectation of privacy was invaded and whether the search was 
justified by the government’s needs.
160
 Courts evaluating searches of 
cell phones incident to arrest have relied on two primary 
justifications: 1) there is a decreased expectation of privacy 
following an arrest that justifies a full search of the arrestee’s 
person,
161
 and 2) a “lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement 
of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.”
162
 
 
 156. See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403–04. 
 157. See supra Part III.A.iii. 
 158. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968). 
 159. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2009); 
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985). 
 160. See, e.g., Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539–40. 
 161. People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 506 (Cal. 2011) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011). 
 162. Id. at 507 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981)). 
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1.  Arrestees Do Not Have 
a Decreased Expectation of 
Privacy in Cell Phones 
Courts have ignored the attributes of items seized during a 
search incident to arrest because the Supreme Court has justified 
those searches on the grounds that there is a decreased expectation of 
privacy following an arrest.
163
 However, the constitutionally 
recognized principles that justify a reduced expectation of privacy 
during searches incident to arrest should not apply to cell-phone 
searches. 
The Court has stated various circumstances that reduce an 
individual’s expectation of privacy,
164
 including when invasions of 
privacy occur due to governmental needs that exceed general 
criminal investigations.
165
 For example, courts have found that 
administrative searches may justify investigative searches.
166
 
However, the Court has often held that one justified invasion of 
privacy for the purposes of criminal investigation cannot alone 
authorize additional investigative searches.
167
 
Courts have repeatedly stated that searches of an individual’s 
person incident to arrest are justified by a reduced expectation of 
privacy.
168
 However, the Court has failed to provide a valid 
 
 163. See id. at 506. 
 164. See, e.g., Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537–39. 
 165. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (stating that 
student athletes have a reduced expectation of privacy because trying out for the team means 
being subjected to a degree of regulation that requires a preseason physical exam, adequate 
insurance coverage, a minimum grade point average, and compliance with additional rules of 
conduct); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 
830–31 (2007) (stating that schoolchildren have a reduced expectation of privacy due to school 
regulations that require routine physical examinations and vaccinations); New York v. Burger, 
482 U.S. 691, 703–07 (1987) (stating that a vehicle-dismantling junkyard has a reduced 
expectation of privacy due to heavy regulations that subject businesses to meet registration 
requirements, obtain a license, and make records and inventory available to inspection by the 
police or an agent of the Department of Motor Vehicles). 
 166. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702 (stating that industries subject to inspection have a 
weakened expectation of privacy). 
 167. See, e.g., Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 14 (1999) (stating that an investigation of 
a murder scene at a home does not authorize a general warrantless search of that home for 
investigative purposes). 
 168. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977); United States v. Edwards, 415 
U.S. 800, 808–09 (1974); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 506 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 
94 (2011). 
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constitutional justification for this conclusion.
169
 In light of cases that 
have recognized a heightened expectation of privacy of the 
individual’s person as compared to the areas within an individual’s 
reach,
170
 the absence of such a justification is strikingly troubling.
171
 
The Court in Robinson stated only that a lawful arrest destroys 
the arrestee’s right to privacy to justify an officer’s per se authority 
to search an arrestee.
172
 However, as the dissent pointed out, Chimel 
rejected the proposition that one lawful intrusion would justify 
additional intrusions.
173
 As the Court in Chimel stated, “[We] can see 
no reason why, simply because some interference with an 
individual’s privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully taken 
place, further intrusions should automatically be allowed despite the 
absence of a warrant that the Fourth Amendment would otherwise 
require.”
174
 Therefore, another constitutionally recognized reason 
must exist to justify the decreased expectation of privacy. 
The Robinson Court also stated that “a search incident to a 
lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement.”
175
 
The Court has recognized traditional intrusions as an arena that 
would warrant a reduced expectation of privacy.
176
 However, 
justifying a search on the grounds of a reduced expectation of 
privacy caused by the search itself would be unacceptable 
 
 169. See, e.g., Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 16 n.10; Edwards, 415 U.S. at 809 (quoting United 
States v. DeLeo, 422 F.3d 487, 493 (1st Cir. 1970)); DeLeo, 422 F.3d at 493. All three cases state 
that an arrestee has a reduced expectation of privacy, but none explains the reason for that 
conclusion. 
 170. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 308 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring); United 
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948). 
 171. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 587 (explaining that a permissible search of a home or car does not 
include permission to search the occupants of the home or car even though an occupant could be 
concealing evidence, because “mere presence” is not sufficient to strip an individual of 
“immunities from search of his person to which he would otherwise be entitled”). 
 172. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (stating that “[i]t is the fact of 
the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search and “a search incident to that arrest 
requires no additional justification”); id. at 260 (Powell, J., concurring) (“I believe that an 
individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no significant Fourth Amendment 
interest in the privacy of his person.”). 
 173. Id. at 256 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 
(1969)). 
 174. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 767 n.12. 
 175. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224. 
 176. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616–17 (1977). 
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“bootstrapping.”
177
 This reasoning also contradicts the reasoning in 
Chimel.
178
 
One viable explanation for a decreased expectation of privacy is 
the administrative consequences of a full custodial arrest. An 
inventory search is part of the administrative steps of 
incarceration.
179
 An arrestee’s items may be searched pursuant to an 
inventory search.
180
 In Illinois v. Lafayette,
181
 the Court upheld a 
routine administrative search pursuant to standard police 
procedures.
182
 It stated four governmental interests that support an 
inventory search: (1) deterring false claims of lost property; (2) 
reducing incidents of theft or carelessness; (3) preventing weapons 
from being introduced to the prison system; and (4) helping police 
identify the arrestee.
183
 In Florida v. Wells,
184
 the Court 
reemphasized the administrative purpose behind inventory searches 
by holding that police officers cannot have “uncanalized discretion,” 
and it stated that inventory searches should be designed to “produce 
an inventory” rather than a “general means of discovering evidence 
of crime.”
185
 
The governmental interests supporting an inventory search 
would not justify a search of the electronic information contained 
within devices like cell phones. A search designed to “produce an 
inventory” in order to deter false claims of lost property and prevent 
the introduction of dangerous instrumentalities would not require the 
examination and cataloging of data within electronic devices.
186
 
Although cataloging the device itself would fall within the scope of 
the general interests of an inventory search, the data on a cell phone 
 
 177. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 720 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 178. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 766–67 n.12. 
 179. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644 (1983). 
 180. Id. at 648. 
 181. 462 U.S. 640 (1983). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 646–67. 
 184. 495 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 185. Id. at 4. Because standard procedures vary, the scope of an inventory search will vary 
depending on the procedures in place. To address the underlying reasons that justify an inventory 
search, this Note proceeds assuming that officers conduct every inventory search to the maximum 
extent possible. 
 186. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *11 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
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could not possibly contain a dangerous instrumentality, be stolen, or 
be the subject of a false claim.
187
 
Arguably, searches of electronic media stored on devices could 
help to identify the arrestee. However, inventory searches designed 
to identify an arrestee have always involved situations in which an 
arrestee could not be identified by other standard means.
188
 
Therefore, absent special circumstances, police do not have general 
authority to use an inventory search to discover identifying 
information. 
Additionally, any official policy that prefers the search of an 
arrestee’s items to standard identification methods would strongly 
indicate that its purpose was a “general means of discovering 
evidence of crime” and would therefore be prohibited.
189
 
Accordingly, an inventory search should not decrease an arrestee’s 
expectation of privacy in the electronic contents of his or her cell 
phone because law enforcement officials do not have a general 
authority to search the data within cell phones to recover identifying 
information. 
The Court has cited a decreased expectation of privacy to justify 
searches of an individual’s person incident to arrest,
190
 but it has not 
articulated a clear reason for why an arrest should result in a 
decreased expectation of privacy. The only rational justification for 
such a conclusion has no bearing on the expectations of privacy in 
electronic data contained on cell phones. Thus, the reduced 
expectation of privacy is merely “a subjective view regarding the 
acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct”
191
 and is an 
unjustified argument. Furthermore, the only viable argument for a 
reduced expectation of privacy does not apply to the contents of a 
cell phone. As a result, to be constitutionally reasonable, a 
 
 187. See, e.g., United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR., 2008 WL 5381412, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 
2011); Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *11. 
 188. See Commonwealth v. Bowen, 223 N.E.2d 391, 393–94 (Mass. 1967) (upholding a 
search when the defendant did not have a driver’s license and vehicle registration information 
was inaccessible at that time); State v. Scroggins, 210 N.W.2d 55, 57–58 (Minn. 1973) 
(upholding a search of the defendant’s pocket, which yielded his billfold, when he refused to 
present identification); State v. Jewell, 469 N.W.2d 247, 1991 WL 74161, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1991) (upholding search of contents of abandoned car when license plates did not match 
registration information). 
 189. Wells, 495 U.S. at 4. 
 190. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977). 
 191. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764–65 (1969). 
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sufficiently strong governmental interest must overcome the privacy 
interest of arrestees. 
2.  Individuals Have 
a Greater Expectation of 
Privacy in Cell Phones 
Robinson and its progeny minimize the privacy interests at 
stake. However, this does not mean that the Court failed to consider 
the intrusiveness of searches when deciding these cases. Rather, the 
Court considered only objects limited by their physical 
characteristics in concluding that a categorical authority to search 
incident to arrest would involve a minimal intrusion on the privacy 
interests of individuals.
192
 The Court arrived at this conclusion 
because physical containers that can be immediately associated with 
the person of an arrestee are small, and their physical capacity 
inherently limited the intrusiveness of warrantless searches incident 
to arrest.
193
 This assumption likely led the Court to conclude without 
proof that, absent rare circumstances, searches of vehicles would 
rarely create a significant intrusion on the privacy of individuals.
194
 
However, modern cell phones are regularly used for the most 
intimate aspects of an individual’s life and surpass the inherent 
limitations and boundaries of physical containers.
195
 
Recent decisions have recognized that modern cell phones have 
the capacity to store vast amounts of information and often contain 
“the most sensitive kinds of personal information, in which 
individuals may reasonably have a substantial expectation of privacy 
 
 192. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (addressing the search of 
a cigarette package); Belton v. New York, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.4 (1981) (explicitly defining a 
container as any object capable of holding another object). 
 193. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991) (stating that requiring officers to 
obtain a warrant before searching a paper sack found in a vehicle during a valid vehicle search 
would “provide[] only minimal protection for privacy and have impeded effective law 
enforcement”). 
 194. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 
583, 590 (1974)). The Court subsequently retreated from this characterization in Arizona v. Gant, 
129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009). 
 195. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010); Ben E. Stewart, Cell Phone 
Searches Incident to Arrest: A New Standard Based on Arizona v. Gant, 99 KY. L.J. 579, 580 
(2011). 
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and for which the law offers heightened protection.”
196
 Even the 
Supreme Court has recognized the intimate nature of cell phones, 
stating that “[c]ell phone and text message communications are so 
pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means 
or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-
identification.”
197
 This characterization is particularly relevant for 
teenagers who have grown up in the digital age. Surveys show that 
over 75 percent of teenagers carry a cell phone on a daily basis and 
use text messaging as a way to communicate personal matters.
198
 
These teens commonly use cell phones for private communication 
and will likely continue to use their cell phones in this manner into 
adulthood.
199
 
Moreover, the data within electronic devices can increase even 
after the arrestee is no longer in control of them.
200
 For instance, 
police officers have answered a defendant’s cell phone when the 
phone received an incoming call after the defendant’s arrest.
201
 
Officers have also used cell phones to obtain additional evidence 
against an arrestee through incoming text messages received after the 
arrest.
202
 Some phones are able to automatically retrieve e-mails and 
 
 196. Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 461 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), cert. granted, 68 So. 
3d 235 (Fla. 2011) (citing Hawkins, 704 S.E.2d 886, 891 (Ga. App. Ct. 2010)); Hawkins, 704 
S.E.2d at 891, aff’d, 723 S.E.2d (Ga. 2012); see also People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 513 (Cal. 
2011) (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (“A contemporary smartphone can hold hundreds or thousands 
of messages, photographs, videos, maps, contacts, financial records, memoranda and other 
documents, as well as records of the user’s telephone calls and Web browsing. Never before has it 
been possible to carry so much personal or business information in one’s pocket or purse.”), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 84 (2011); United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 
(N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007); Oxton, supra note 59, at 1201 (stating that modern cell phones can 
store massive amounts of private information and describing the capabilities of the iPhone 3GS). 
 197. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630. 
 198. Amy Vorenberg, Indecent Exposure: Do Warrantless Searches of a Student’s Cell 
Phone Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 17 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 62, 63, 78 (2012). 
 199. Cf. Press Release, CTIA, National Study Reveals How Teens Are Shaping & Reshaping 
Their Wireless World. Study Sheds New Light on Teens’ Cell Phone Habits, Expectations & 
Dream Phone Wishes (Sept. 12, 2008), available at http://ctia.org/media/press/body.cfm/prid/ 
1774 (describing how cellular telephones have impacted teenagers and their expectations for the 
future). 
 200. See State v. Carroll, 778 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Wis. 2010); see also United States v. Gomez, 
807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137–39 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (describing an officer answering a call received 
after he had seized the cell phone and using the defendant’s cell phone to exchange text messages 
with a third party); United States v. Davis, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (D. Or. 2011) (describing 
an officer answering a call that was received after the officer had seized the defendant’s phone). 
 201. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1138–39; Davis, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1165; Carroll, 778 N.W.2d 
at 12. 
 202. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1139–40. 
  
1380 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1351 
 
other data,
203
 which is yet another feature that police officers may 
take advantage of when investigating arrestees.
204
 Therefore, 
electronic devices are further distinguished from any of their 
physical counterparts because the content of electronic devices may 
potentially expand, even when an arrestee is already in police 
custody. 
Cell phones do not comport with the physical limitations of 
standard containers contemplated in Robinson; their contents are not 
limited by the physical restrictions in the way that the contents of 
standard containers are, making cell-phone searches a far greater 
invasion of privacy than searches of standard containers. With the 
infinite amount of private data contained on a cell phone and its 
ability to continue to collect additional private information, a search 
of a cell phone’s data would likely be a severe intrusion into the most 
intimate details of a person’s life.
205
 Accordingly, the cell phone 
should be subject to a heightened expectation of privacy. 
3.  The Government’s Interest 
Fails to Overcome the 
Heightened Expectation of Privacy 
Although Belton categorically stated that “[a] lawful custodial 
arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest,”
206
 Belton 
explicitly defined a container as “any object capable of holding 
another object.”
207
 While cases have relied on Belton’s rationale to 
authorize searches of the contents of cell phones,
208
 physical 
containers have inherent limitations that make searches of them far 
less intrusive than searches of cell phones. Therefore, an analysis of 
a cell-phone search that relies on the Belton rationale would be 
shallow and faulty because it would ignore key distinguishing 
 
 203. See iPhone, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/batteries/iphone.html (last visited Oct. 22, 
2011) (discussing how reducing data and e-mail retrieval may extend battery life). 
 204. See Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1139–40. 
 205. Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 461 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“[C]ell phones can 
make the entirety of one’s personal life available for perusing by an officer every time someone is 
arrested for any offense.”). 
 206. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981). 
 207. Id. at 460 n.4. 
 208. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 507 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 
(2011); People v. Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 904 (Ct. App. 2011). 
  
Summer 2012] PAY PHONE PROTECTIONS 1381 
features, namely the breadth and nature of information,
209
 at the heart 
of Fourth Amendment concerns. 
Furthermore, electronic devices do not implicate the policy 
rationales underlying searches incident to arrest. Rather, searches of 
cell phones incident to arrest require a novel examination of the 
police and privacy interests at stake because such searches are not 
tethered to the underlying rationales that originally justified the 
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine.
210
 
Few, if any, governmental interests support searching the data 
on a cell phone incident to arrest. The only identifiable police 
interests would be a need for a clear, bright-line rule that 
encompasses the electronic data of cell phones and a greater 
authority for crime prevention.
211
 However, the needs that justify a 
bright-line rule are inapplicable in the cell-phone context because 
cell phones do not present inherently ambiguous situations regarding 
potential weapons or the potential destruction of evidence; excluding 
cell phones would not blur the bright-line rule. Furthermore, the 
remaining police interest in general crime prevention, although 
compelling, must yield to the Fourth Amendment. 
On the other hand, the privacy interests at stake are 
exceptionally high due to the intimate nature and sheer volume of the 
content of cell phones.
212
 Cell phones implicate great privacy 
concerns due to the breadth of information they contain and their 
ability to continue to expand their content even when outside of the 
owner’s control.
213
 
A fresh balancing of the governmental and privacy interests 
shows that the blanket authority to search a cell phone incident to 
arrest is not reasonable. Cell phones implicate heightened privacy 
concerns demanding greater Fourth Amendment protections. 
Additionally, they do not trigger the concerns about officer safety 
and loss of evidence that justify other searches incident to an arrest. 
Finally, the police interest in bright-line rules does not provide a 
 
 209. Smallwood, 61 So. 3d at 461. 
 210. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343–46 (2009). 
 211. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 459–60 (stating that citizens cannot know the scope of their 
constitutional rights and that police officers cannot know the scope of their authority when a 
doctrine is not settled); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (stating that officer 
decisions are usually ad hoc decisions and need not be subsequently scrutinized by the courts). 
 212. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 213. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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strong argument for a categorical authority to search cell phones 
incident to arrest. One court agreed, stating the following: 
The bright-line rule established by Robinson may have been 
prudent at the time, given the finite amount of personal 
information an arrestee could carry on his or her person or 
within his or her reach. However, the Robinson court could 
not have contemplated the nearly infinite wealth of personal 
information cell phones and other similar electronic devices 
can hold.
214
 
4.  The Fourth Amendment 
Requires a Retreat from 
Robinson’s Unqualified Authority 
to Search Cell Phones Incident to Arrest 
A principal purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prohibit 
general warrants that authorize police officers to arbitrarily search 
individuals.
215
 The bright-line rule in Robinson, when combined with 
the vast amount of information that can be accessed by cell phones, 
enables officers to engage in the “unrestrained and thoroughgoing 
examination of [an arrestee] and his [or her] personal effects” that 
the Chimel Court condemned.
216
 The current rules governing 
searches incident to arrest essentially authorize and encourage such 
behavior, which is antithetical to the principles behind the Fourth 
Amendment. 
A significant risk of abuse arises when the wealth of information 
stored in cell phones collides with the broad authority of police 
officers to search an arrestee incident to arrest.
217
 The evidentiary 
interest supporting searches incident to arrest is virtually limitless
218
 
and essentially authorizes the type of unrestricted search that Judge 
 
 214. Smallwood, 61 So. 3d at 461. 
 215. Gant, 556 U.S. at 345 (“A rule that gives police the power to conduct [an unjustified] 
search . . . creates a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals. Indeed, 
the character of that threat implicates the central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment—the 
concern about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s 
private effects.”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969). 
 216. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1967)). 
 217. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Chimel, 395 U.S. at 
767–68. 
 218. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2 (4th ed. 2011). 
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Learned Hand stated was “indistinguishable from what might be 
done under a general warrant.”
219
 The dissent in Robinson 
recognized that granting a broad authority to conduct investigative 
searches provides police officers with a tremendous incentive to 
arrest individuals for minor offenses, such as traffic violations, as a 
pretext to search for evidence of other offenses without a warrant.
220
 
Furthermore, because searching privately-owned cell phones is 
inexpensive,
221
 this authority is even more susceptible to abuse 
because it escapes one of “the ordinary checks that constrain abusive 
law enforcement practices: limited police resources.”
222
 Worse yet, 
even though the courts have recognized the impropriety of using 
arrests as a pretext to search for evidence,
223
 the Court in Whren v. 
United States
224
 essentially eliminated any legal prohibitions on such 
a practice and has left private citizens without a remedy.
225
 
IV.  PROPOSAL 
The expansion of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine seems to 
reflect a judicial reluctance to exclude credible evidence.
226
 The 
cases that expand the search-incident-to-arrest exception have always 
involved situations in which the admissibility of evidence was highly 
probative of a defendant’s guilt.
227
 These decisions were likely 
colored by the potential consequence of “set[ting] the criminal loose 
in the community without punishment.”
228
 Under these 
circumstances, the judiciary’s willingness to narrow procedural 
protections is not surprising.
229
 Even lower courts that disagree with 
 
 219. United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926). 
 220. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 221. Cf. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing GPS tracking as 
opposed to traditional police surveillance). 
 222. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)). 
 223. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 224. 517 U.S. 806. 
 225. See id. at 812–13. 
 226. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (“Exclusion exacts a heavy toll on 
both the judicial system and society at large . . . [because] its bottom-line effect, in many cases, is 
to suppress the truth and set the criminal loose in the community without punishment.”). 
 227. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 456 (1981) (finding evidence of cocaine in 
a jacket); Robinson, 414 U.S. at 222–23 (finding evidence of heroin within a cigarette package). 
 228. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427. 
 229. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 457 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The cost of 
suppressing evidence of guilt will always make the value of a procedural safeguard appear 
‘minimal,’ ‘marginal,’ or ‘incremental.’ . . . The individual interest in procedural safeguards that 
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Supreme Court precedent often hesitate to distinguish cases.
230
 This 
attitude resulted in the doctrine that wholly departs from the 
principles of the Fourth Amendment, a problem that can now be 
remedied only at the Supreme Court level.
231
 
Although cell phones have been the primary focus of recent 
decisions, the same analogies seen in cell-phone cases have been 
applied to other devices, though not in the context of searches 
incident to arrest. Courts have already justified searches of other 
advanced technologies by applying poor functional analogies or 
disregarding their characteristics.
232
 To restore fidelity to the Fourth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court must make a new doctrine for 
electronic devices that (1) prohibits courts from applying outdated 
approaches to modern technologies and (2) restricts the tremendous 
potential for abuse. Without a rule that restricts searches of the data 
stored on cell phones and other technological devices in the future, 
citizens will be “at the mercy of advancing technology.”
233
 However, 
the rule must maintain clarity and eliminate the need for officers to 
conduct a fact-sensitive inquiry in order to determine the scope of 
their authority. 
 
minimize the risk of error is easily discounted when the fact of guilt appears certain beyond 
doubt.”). 
 230. See, e.g., Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), cert. 
granted, 68 So. 3d 235 (Fla. 2011); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 517 (Cal. 2011) (stating that if 
precedents need to be reevaluated to account for modern technology, only the Supreme Court 
may do so), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011). But see State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 
2009). 
 231. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (rejecting the broad reading of 
Belton as an “anathema to the Fourth Amendment”). 
 232. United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 523 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he sheer amount of 
information contained on a computer does not distinguish the authorized search of the computer 
from an analogous search of a file cabinet containing a large number of documents.”); United 
States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding the suspicionless search of a 
laptop at the border because the quality and nature of a laptop is irrelevant to the Fourth 
Amendment analysis). But see United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001)) (“[B]ecause computers can 
hold so much information touching on many different areas of a person’s life, there is a greater 
potential for the intermingling of documents and a consequent invasion of privacy when police 
execute a search for evidence on a computer.” (original quotation marks and brackets omitted)); 
United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that analogizing a computer 
to a file cabinet “may be inadequate,” and that relying on such analogies “may lead courts to 
oversimplify a complex area of Fourth Amendment Doctrines and ignore the realities of massive 
modern computer storage” (quoting Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and 
Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 104 (1994)) (original quotation marks omitted)). 
 233. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001). 
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Though scholars have advanced many proposals, they fail to 
address the concerns that attend to searches incident to arrest in the 
modern era. The most effective approach to restore fidelity to Fourth 
Amendment principles would be to restrict the applicability of 
Robinson and its progeny to physical containers only and to address 
new technologies based on general Fourth Amendment principles 
that govern searches incident to arrest. 
A.  Flaws of Prior Proposals 
Prior proposals that address searches of digital media on cell 
phones fail to account for one or more of the concerns stated above. 
One scholar suggests drawing a distinction between older generation 
cell phones and new “smartphones,” requiring a warrant for 
“smartphones” and distinguishing between coding and content-based 
information stored on older cell phones.
234
 The scholar further 
suggests using the presence of a touch screen or a full keyboard as 
“an easily ascertainable line of distinction.”
235
 
Although this suggestion proposes a seemingly clear rule, cell 
phones are constantly evolving and its distinction may not be 
relevant in the near future.
236
 Already, over two thousand cell phone 
models are available in the United States alone.
237
 Additionally, this 
distinction presupposes that older generation cell phones lack the 
storage capacity and access to information of new generation cell 
phones.
238
 Moreover, this rule would be impractical because it would 
require police officers to determine whether a phone is new or old 
generation.
239
 
Other suggestions include (1) limiting the search to a set number 
of “steps,” in which, for example, opening a file would constitute a 
step, or (2) distinguishing between data stored on the device and 
 
 234. Orso, supra note 138, at 221–22. Orso defines coding information as data that “reveals 
only the identity of a party to a communication without disclosing the subject matter of that 
communication.” Id. at 188. He also defines content-based information as “the subject matter of a 
communication as well as privately stored data reserved for one’s personal use.” Id. at 193. 
 235. Id. at 222. 
 236. Snyder, supra note 140, at 181. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 181–82. 
 239. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (2009) (“[I]t would not be helpful to create a rule 
that requires officers to discern the capabilities of a cell phone before acting accordingly.”). 
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remotely stored data that are accessible from the device.
240
 However, 
both of these suggestions are severely flawed. 
The “steps” approach has no constitutional basis, is entirely 
arbitrary, and would lead to “fuzzy inquiries” regarding what 
constitutes a step.
241
 Furthermore, there would be no principled way 
to determine the appropriate number of steps. In addition, this 
method presupposes that more private data take more “steps” to 
access. However, because private data are often located in commonly 
used features, such as e-mail, text messaging, call logs, and stored 
phone numbers,
242
 phones can be configured to provide quick access 
to those features.
243
 
Permitting searches incident to an arrest based on where the data 
are actually stored creates practical problems. Officers would be 
required to understand how cell phones store data, and certain pieces 
of data would blur the lines. For instance, if a cell phone accesses  
e-mails and stores them locally for quick access, would this data be 
considered locally or remotely stored? The potential ambiguities 
make this approach impractical, and an officer is ill equipped to 
distinguish between remote and local data without specialized 
knowledge that is most likely outside of his or her area of expertise. 
Others have proposed a rule that follows Arizona v. Gant.
244
 
Gant addressed vehicle searches incident to arrest and crafted a rule 
based on “circumstances unique to the automobile context.”
245
 The 
Court authorized searches of vehicles incident to arrest in situations 
in which an arrestee could still reach the passenger compartment of a 
vehicle or the officer had a reasonable belief that “evidence of the 
offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”
246
 
Although this rule may be appropriate in the vehicle context, 
this standard could be susceptible to abuse when applied to cell 
phones. The breadth of information stored in a cell phone, especially 
 
 240. Gershowitz, supra note 34, at 54–57. Gershowitz also discusses other potential solutions 
in his paper that are not discussed in this Note. Id. at 45–57. 
 241. Id. at 54–55. 
 242. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010). 
 243. E.g., Windows Phone: Pin Things to Start, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/ 
windowsphone/en-us/howto/wp7/start/pin-things-to-start.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
 244. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009); Stewart, supra note 195, at 598. 
 245. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714. 
 246. Id. 
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its stored communications, would allow officers to claim that they 
reasonably believed that an arrestee’s cell phone contained evidence 
of the crime. For example, an officer could claim that an arrestee’s 
cell phone contained communications with suspected accomplices. 
Thus, this standard is susceptible to abuse and may not provide a 
meaningful constraint on police authority. Furthermore, a 
reasonableness standard involves a fact-based analysis that does not 
clearly define the scope of an officer’s authority. 
Another scholar proposed that courts follow State v. Smith, 
which categorically prohibits warrantless searches of cell phones 
incident to arrest and forces officers to rely on other traditional 
exigencies.
247
 The California legislature took a similar approach with 
SB 914.
248
 The limitations on police conduct pursuant to SB 914 
would be similar to the holding in State v. Smith, in that officers 
would not be able to search a cell phone without a warrant or an 
exigent circumstance.
249
 
Although both Smith and SB 914 are steps in the right direction, 
the categorical prohibition of warrantless cell-phone searches fails to 
address one of the core problems that taints the current jurisprudence 
of cell-phone searches incident to arrest: the tendency of courts to 
poorly analogize novel technologies to standard containers in an 
effort to bring them within the scope of Robinson. 
B.  A Simple and Effective Approach 
to Reconnect Searches Incident to Arrest 
with Fourth Amendment Principles 
In order to reconnect searches incident to arrest with Fourth 
Amendment principles, the Supreme Court must take a more drastic 
approach than simply limiting the applicability of Robinson to cell 
phones. It should restrict Robinson’s rule to physical containers only, 
and when addressing novel technologies, courts should engage in a 
fresh balancing of the interests at stake rather than analogize to 
 
 247. Snyder, supra note 140, at 180–81. 
 248. Amy Gahan, California Governor Allows Warrantless Search of Cell Phones, CNN 
(Oct. 11, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-10-11/tech/tech_mobile_california-phone-search-
veto_1_cell-phones-smartphone-text-messages?_s=PM:TECH. Governor Brown subsequently 
vetoed this bill, much to the dismay of its supporters. Id. 
 249. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 956 (Ohio 2009); Bob Egelko, Bill Would Require 
Warrant to Search Cell Phone, SF GATE (July 4, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/07/04/BAQF1K3SVJ.DTL. 
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precedent. Without a rule that restricts the application of old 
precedents to novel technologies, citizens will be left “at the mercy 
of advancing technology.”
250
 
After Robinson, searches incident to arrest operated outside of 
Fourth Amendment principles.
251
 When combined with the wealth of 
private information stored on cell phones,
252
 Robinson created a 
tremendous incentive to abuse searches incident to arrest.
253
 
Furthermore, limited police resources will not provide a check on 
this abuse, as officers can search privately-owned devices easily and 
inexpensively.
254
 Restricting Robinson and its progeny to only 
physical containers will minimize the incentive for officers to utilize 
abusive tactics because it would prevent officers from accessing cell 
phone data. 
Additionally, this approach would still allow officers to engage 
in reasonable searches. Physical containers are inherently ambiguous 
and might contain hidden weapons that threaten an officer’s safety or 
physical evidence that can be destroyed.
255
 These situations implicate 
the twin concerns underlying a search incident to arrest,
256
 and the 
inherent ambiguities surrounding physical containers necessitate a 
bright line rule, especially when officer safety is at stake.
257
 
 
 250. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning whether old Fourth Amendment 
doctrines are “ill suited to the digital age”). 
 251. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); id. at 239 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“In the present case, however, the majority turns its back on [Fourth Amendment] 
principles, holding that ‘the fact of the lawful arrest’ always establishes the authority to conduct a 
full search of the arrestee’s person, regardless of whether in a particular case ‘there was present 
one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful 
arrest.’”). 
 252. See, e.g., Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955; see also Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 461 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that cell phones and other electronic devices hold an “infinite 
wealth of personal information”); Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (D. Or. 
Jan. 18, 2012) (stating that a rule authorizing searches of electronic devices incident to arrest 
would put “any citizen . . . at risk of having his or her most intimate information viewed by an 
arresting officer.”). 
 253. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is 
susceptible to abuse.”). 
 254. Id. (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)) (stating that limited police 
resources is an ordinary constraint on abusive police conduct). 
 255. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 256. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969). 
 257. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973). 
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Moreover, physical containers implicate minimal privacy 
concerns. The physical dimensions of a container necessarily limit 
the intrusiveness of a search,
258
 and containers are subject to a 
decreased expectation of privacy because all physical items are 
within the scope of an administrative inventory search.
259
 Therefore, 
the broad authority to search physical containers is reasonable 
because the police interests in preserving evidence, protecting 
officers, and clarifying uncertain situations outweigh the privacy 
interests at stake. 
On the other hand, the balance of factors compels data stored on 
cell phones to be categorically excluded from searches incident to 
arrest.
260
 Electronic data on cell phones cannot hide weapons, and 
any information they contain would be very difficult to erase 
permanently.
261
 Remote wipe applications may increase the threat of 
losing data, but an officer can remove the battery or cut off the signal 
without searching the cell phone to address that risk.
262
 Because 
electronic data fall outside the scope of an inventory search, they are 
not subject to a reduced expectation of privacy.
263
 Furthermore, 
categorically excluding data stored on cell phones will not create 
uncertainty because electronic data are clearly distinguishable from 
the contents of a physical container. 
This analysis strongly suggests that data on all electronic 
devices should fall outside the scope of a search incident to arrest. 
New technologies share many characteristics with modern cell 
phones.
264
 Even older technologies, such as pagers, have advanced to 
the point that the concerns expressed in United States v. Ortiz may be 
outdated.
265
 Additionally, a rule that excludes all electronic devices 
would eliminate the need for officers to categorize devices. 
However, even without a blanket rule governing electronic devices, 
an officer may address uncertain situations by obtaining a warrant 
 
 258. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 259. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 260. See supra Parts III.A.3 and III.B.1. 
 261. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 262. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 263. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 264. iPad: Technical Specifications, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/ipad/specs/ (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2012). 
 265. United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996); see, e.g., Advisor II: Overview, 
MOTOROLA, http://www.motorola.com/Business/US-EN/Business+Product+and+Services/Two-
Way+Radios+and+Pagers+-+Business/Pagers/Advisor+II_US-EN (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). 
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with minimal risk of evidence loss. If circumstances present a high 
likelihood that evidence will be destroyed, an officer may still rely 
on other exceptions to the warrant requirement.
266
  
V.  CONCLUSION 
When old Fourth Amendment doctrines collide with modern 
technologies, once-reasonable decisions create unreasonable results. 
Prior courts crafted rules without considering the technologies 
available today. Modern courts have continued to apply these 
precedents but have not considered the implied limitations of prior 
decisions that often make their reasoning inapplicable to the unique 
qualities of modern technologies. When combined with a judicial 
reluctance to exclude relevant evidence, doctrines expand and 
deviate from Fourth Amendment principles. Searches incident to 
arrest are no exception to this result and have been expanded to allow 
officers to conduct highly invasive searches without any procedural 
safeguards. 
The Supreme Court must restrict the search-incident-to-arrest 
doctrine so that searches of cell phones, and all future technologies, 
do not become general warrants that authorize police officers to 
intrude into the most intimate details of an individual’s life. The 
Court must take action to ensure that modern devices do not 
eviscerate the fundamental protections at the core of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
 
 266. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011). 
